1) When did China know about the Taiwan office?
According to an article in the Diplomat, they knew all along, citing an article in the state run Guyana Chronicle in which Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Elizabeth Harper, “highlighted that China was aware of the decision to open the Taiwanese trade office in Guyana, and that the establishment of the office was geared towards “attracting trade and investment opportunities”.
Which then begs the question why did the Chinese wait so long to object? Might it have been the way it was (mis)communicated by Washington and Taipei as some win for democracy? In other words Guyana might have felt that China, being aware of the office - which a Taiwanese team was already in the country looking to set up- and by saying nothing, had given a tacit green light. As the Diplomat article points out “Taiwan has representative offices in a large number of countries with which it lacks formal diplomatic relations.” Perhaps what the Chinese could not accept was the point scoring. As for Guyana, The Diplomat “notes the reference to “media reports” and “miscommunication” in Guyana’s eventual decision to rescind the agreement suggests Georgetown was not prepared to go public. Facing questions at home, and likely displeasure from Beijing, Guyana’s government decided to bow out.”
Who in the Guyana government agreed to this decision?
Given that the US made the announcement, the original idea would have come from Washington, and the dates indicate that it was a Trump initiative (even if Biden seems just as hawkish on China). But it still had to have been agreed to by the Guyana government. Was this decision made within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? There is little doubt such an important and politically sensitive issue would have gone to the President. While Minister of Foreign Affairs Hugh Todd is the one who initially defended the move, we have not heard from any other Cabinet member explaining the rationale. It is also worth noting that Todd has a masters in international relations and while his views appear aligned to a strong American foreign policy, it is unlikely he would have seen much benefit from this decision. A Sunday Stabroek editorial suggested “diplomatic background and skills are so attenuated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that there was no one to give the Minister and by extension, the administration, the full history and conditions of relations with China over the past half century, and the likely consequences of establishing relations with Taiwan at any level.”
One should also consider that the PPP/C’s long held fear of a hostile America may have been a factor. Vishnu Bisram who writes out of New York and is a voice of the influential Indian Guyanese Diaspora: “Guyana must not get on the wrong side of the US. We remember all too well what happened in 1953, 1964, 2015, and 2020. Governments paid dearly for crossing with the US.”
On the other hand here’s the inimitable (KN) Dem Boys Seh who “wan know just what going on at Takuba Lodge. De place in total confusion. But is suh when yuh gat too many cooks stirring de broth…But dem boys feel dat some body bin sucking up to de Americans. And dem boys wan know is who because dat person look like dem gat more loyalty to Uncle Sam dan even de US embassy in Guyana.”
3) What did China say to Guyana to make them so quickly correct the mistake?
Pure conjecture but let’s ask ourselves who has more influence with Maduro right now? China or the US? And who knows, maybe Minister Todd could have extracted something from China for the U-turn?
4)What are the long term consequences of this diplomatic debacle?
Basically Guyana has managed in very short order to upset two superpowers and Taiwan. It is also humiliating diplomatically, especially when one reads headlines about Guyana “kowtowing” to Beijing. Taiwan is done with Guyana even as it laid the blame on China for its bullying tactics. That said in his Sunday Stabroek column Ralph Ramkarran warned: “The Government terminated the agreement with Taiwan on the ground of ‘misstatements.’ It is not quite clear if this refers to the premature disclosure by the US. If so it means that Guyana is not in principle opposed to a Taiwan office in Guyana. Can we therefore expect that this issue will emerge in the future once again to cause contentious relations with a tried and tested friend?”
As for the USA, the Taiwan News wrote: “This incident will test the Biden's administration's willingness to enforce the TAIPEI Act, which was expressly designed to counter such coercion by China to sever ties with Taiwan. It calls for a carrot-and-stick approach to countries that China pressures to cut or avoid ties with Taiwan.
The carrot for those countries that build or strengthen ties with Taiwan is increased economic security and diplomatic engagement with the U.S. However, the stick is the reduction of American economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that side with Beijing.
The Biden administration praised Guyana when the agreement appeared to have been finalized. Now that Guyana has kowtowed to Beijing, the question is whether the administration will take the kind of punitive action prescribed in the TAIPEI Act.”
That may be wishful thinking: One diplomat told us the US must take some responsibility for breaking the news and characterising it as a diplomatic win thereby placing Guyana in an intolerable situation. He did not see this affecting the growing closer relationship with Guyana, a country America is cultivating not just in relation to combating China’s presence in the Americas but for its proximity to Venezuela and in order to secure long term oil reserves.
As for China/Guyana relations, Sunday Stabroek said it did not see much damage: “…once Beijing has secured the outcome it wants, the kind of balance it seeks to maintain will be restored. It will have been alerted to the fact, however, that in a kind of sublimated way it may be confronting the US more directly here than it has sometimes had to do in the past and that Washington’s greater vested interest in this country will introduce a new dimension to activities locally.”
Closer ties to Beijing would be the most ironic consequence of this week’s events.